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Shusterman on Europe, Entertainment,
and Equality1
Stefán Snævarr
Richard Shusterman is one of the world’s most interesting aestheticians. 
He has been an advocate of pragmatist aesthetics; an aesthetics which 
emphasises the practical side of art and the aesthetic, while at the same 
time opposing any rigid separation between art and life or between high 
and low culture. Shusterman actually belongs to that rare breed of aes-
theticians, which takes popular culture seriously. He defends this kind of 
culture, maintaining that it speaks on behalf of ordinary folks. It is not 
by chance that the US, the country of the common Man, has been a strong-
hold of popular culture. In the first place, even though far from classless, 
America’s social structure is arguable more flexible and more decentred 
than the structures of traditional European societies. Secondly, Americans 
have tended to be sceptical of European high culture because they had 
to fight for their independence from Europe.2 Thirdly, being a country of 
immigrants there has been no unique national tradition of high art. The 
fact that the American educational system is not centralized has weak-
ened whatever possibilities there were for enforcing cultural uniformity.3 
Fourthly, highbrow elitism has a much stronger position in Europe with 
its feudalistic traditions, than in democratic and egalitarian America. The 
notion of high art was invented by aristocrats to ensure their social privi-
lege. Fifthly, there are national churches in (all?) European countries. The 
ecclesial tradition provided a strong and institutionally entrenched ideal of 
spiritualized experience and a tendency of pious attitudes towards works 
of art. Moreover, this tradition provided an intellectual priestly class that 
directed and regulated the propriety of this transcendental experience and 
its discourse. With secularization, the religious sentiments were project-
ed into a religion of high art. Not so in America. It had weaker religious 
traditions than Europe4 and a dour Puritanism that was uncongenial to 
aesthetic appropriation. In the sixth place, American popular culture em-
bodies a rebellious attitude towards the cultural hegemony of intellectuals 
in Europe. This is appealing to Europeans, especially the young, who find 
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American popular culture an invaluable tool for liberation from cultural 
domination.5
These six groups of statements about the US, Europe, equality and 
popu lar culture have certain, both explicit and implicit hypotheses as pre-
conditions. Let us look at four of them:
(a) The more egalitarian a country is, the stronger the position of 
popular culture within that country; 
(b) American popular culture enjoys worldwide popularity because of 
its egalitarian style, and/or because everything American is associ-
ated with egalitarianism; 
(c) Europe has no popular culture to speak of; 
(d) Europe is an entity of the same kind as the US. The USA is more 
egalitarian than Europe.
Now, I am not saying that there is any strict logical entailment between 
(a)–(d) and my initial six groups of statements about Shusterman’s posi-
tion. However, if (a)–(d) prove wrong, at least for the most part, then it is 
hard to see why one should believe in Shusterman’s contention, unless I 
have misrepresented it in some grotesque fashion. 
The rest of this paper will be devoted to a critical analysis of the hypo-
theses (a)–(d).
(a) Egalitarianism and popular culture: If feudal traditions and sharp class 
distinctions are the enemies of popular culture, how is it that the British 
have such a strong position in the realm of popular culture? British writers 
such as Sir Arthur Conan Doyle and Agatha Christie were responsible for 
the huge popularity of the whodunit, and what about the worldwide popu-
larity of British fantasy fiction and books for children? Certainly, everybody 
has heard of books like Harry Potter, The Lord of the Rings, Peter Pan, Mary 
Poppins, the Narnia Books and Alice in Wonderland. 
Popular music has a strong tradition in Britain; witness the music 
hall songs of the late 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. 
Actually, the current strength of the musicals in London has roots back 
in the 19th century.6 Today’s popular musical composers such as Sir 
Andrew Lloyd Webber have predecessors in the second to last century, 
Gilbert and Sullivan for instance. Furthermore, the very British Beatles 
caused the worldwide triumph of rock and the triumph of the English 
language as the lingua franca of pop music. For a while, British pop and 
rock almost eclipsed American popular music.7 Even though this is not 
the case anymore, the Brits still rock the world; thus, the British group 
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Coldplay is thought to be the second biggest rock act in the world next 
to the Irish group U2. 
Britain’s neighbours, Belgium and France, also have feudalistic tradi-
tions and are far from egalitarian. Despite this, these countries have a 
thriving industry of comic books. People around the world enjoy reading 
about the adventures of Tintin and the Herculean feats of the endearing 
Gauls, Asterix and Obelix. 
Additionally, the feudal Habsburg Empire was the motherland of oper-
ettas and waltzes, the pop and hip-hop of fin-de-siècle Western culture. 
No less than 1100 operettas of Austro-Hungarian origin were staged in 
Vienna between 1858 and 1938. Actually, Austria was one of the centres of 
international pop music in this era.8 Notice that the somewhat less feudal 
Wilhelmine German Empire could not really compete with the Habsburg 
Empire in the realm of popular tunes.9 This fact further weakens Shuster-
man’s implicit contention that feudalism is no friend of popular culture. 
Yet another country with a strong feudal tradition, Japan has a very 
powerful impact on modern popular culture. The fact that the country 
is a world leader in the making of animation movies serves as evidence. 
Further more, the Japanese have completely dominated the design and 
production of the computer games and their Pokemon-paraphernalia 
have enjoyed great global popularity. Japan is also the world leader in 
comics, producing 50 % of all comic books.10 
No countries in the world produce more action movies and light enter-
tainment than India and Hong Kong. These countries are not renowned for 
their egalitarianism; India (in)famously suffering from the vestiges of an 
old caste system. Brazil is even less egalitarian and it is generally thought 
to be the country in the world with the least equal distribution of income. 
Nevertheless, Brazilians are famed for their samba songs and soap operas, 
which enjoy great international popularity. Their Argentine neighbours 
also live in an extremely unequal society. Despite this, they have created the 
vibrant popular culture of the tango. Actually, dance music from the Latin-
American countries was very popular in the US during the 1940s and the 
1950s, making such singers as Brazil’s Carmen Miranda world stars. 
Yet another case in point is the not exactly equal Venezuela; a country 
that produces soap operas en masse. These soaps are popular all over the 
Spanish-speaking world as anybody who has ever turned on a TV set in a 
Spanish hotel is liable to know. 
Now, neither Nazi Germany nor the communist states were feudalistic, 
but they were inegalitarian in the sense that power was concentrated in 
the hands of the few and that the power elite led a much more comfortable 
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life than the bulk of the population. All the same, they had their own en-
tertainment industries, state-run in the communist case, state-controlled 
in the case of the Nazis. The infamous Nazi minister of propaganda, Jo-
seph Goebbels, understood that in order to keep the masses happy, they 
had to be provided with bread and circus, but not necessarily direct propa-
ganda. Thanks to him most of the movies produced in Nazi-Germany were 
light entertainment, with the odd propaganda movie thrown in for good 
measure. It has been calculated that only a low percentage of the feature 
films made in Germany during the Nazi era were outright propaganda or 
serious movies, while almost half of them were comedies or musicals, the 
bulk of the rest being adventure movies and suchlike.11 Fascist Italy was 
not very different; the neo-realism of Italian film in the first post-fascist 
years was a reaction against the glamour of Italian fascist movies.
Boring propaganda was perhaps the hallmark of communist movies, but 
the communist countries also made movies for entertainment. Even in the 
bleak Stalin era, the Soviets made lavish musicals and East Germans made 
Westerns, which were called Indian movies for politically correct reasons, in 
that the Indians were the nice guys, the cowboys the bad guys.12 
These Indian movies were probably rather silly, but, notwithstanding, 
hypothesis (a) is refuted. 
(b) Egalitarianism makes US entertainment popular: There might be a cer-
tain grain of truth in (b). For Sergio Leone and Federico Fellini, growing 
up in fascist Italy, watching American movies was a liberating experience. 
Indeed, it should not come as any surprise that by becoming acquainted 
with American popular culture after the war, the Italians, the Japanese 
and the Germans did themselves a world of good. They got to know a new 
kind of hero; the free spirited individual of, say the Western movies, who 
stood up against authority. This may have made them more receptive to 
the ideas of democracy and individual freedom. Some people, such as the 
Japanese writer Haruki Murakami, stress the liberating effect American 
culture had upon them.13 Further, the British learned rock and roll from 
the Americans and developed it in their own way. Interestingly enough, 
the British rock wave has been an important factor in changing the class 
structure in Britain as a lot of working class kids have hit the big time 
thanks to rock music. 
However, we cannot infer from this bridging of social gaps in Britain 
that popular culture has an egalitarian content. It is even more difficult to 
prove that American popular culture is popular because of its supposed 
egalitarian nature; in fact, it does not seem that there are any compelling 
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reasons to believe that its popularity has anything to do with egalitarian-
ism. The culture of the rich and powerful has always been admired. Every-
body imitated French fashion and culture when the not so very egalitar-
ian France was on the top of the food chain just like the US nowadays. In 
the Third World and ex-communist countries, American consumer goods 
are symbols of affluence, not egalitarianism. In these countries, eating 
at McDonald’s is an act of ostensive consumption, just as buying French 
clothes was in earlier times. So, in these lands distinctions are created 
with the aid of the supposedly egalitarian American culture. 
Later, we shall see that the US is not nearly as egalitarian as Shuster-
man thinks and that there are even more reasons to doubt (b) than those 
I have hitherto discussed. For the time being, suffice it to say that even if 
there is a grain of truth in (b), it is probably not extremely big. 
(c) No entertainment in Europe? We have already seen that neither Britain, 
France, Belgium nor Nazi-Germany did suffer or continue to suffer from 
any lack of popular culture. In reality, there has never been any shortage 
of entertainment in Europe. The Roman gladiator games were pure, if 
nasty, entertainment for the vulgar masses and the Elizabethan theatres 
provided entertainment for both rich and poor. So were the Greek the-
atres of antiquity which contained seats for up to 14.000 spectators.14 15 
The modern Greek bouzouki music certainly is not aristocratic; it is a 
bona fide low-class cultural phenomenon. Despite this, it has become a 
part of Greek cultural identity16 and now enjoys worldwide fame. The 
popular music and dances of Ireland have also become a part of the Irish 
national identity. Who does not know Irish drinking songs or the river 
dance shows? And who has not heard of such Irish rock and/or pop acts 
as U2 or Westlife? The fact that Ireland has such a strong tradition for 
popular music speaks not only against hypothesis (b) but also against (a). 
For centuries Ireland was a truly feudal society where British lords subju-
gated the Gaelic-speaking majority. 
Other European countries have been the cradles of such forms of popu-
lar entertainment as commedia dell’arte, opera buffa, ordinary operas, the 
operettas, the circuses, the revues, the cabarets, the Grand Guignol plays,17 
the serialized novels and, last but not least, the movies. Now, if anybody 
objects to ordinary operas being called forms of popular entertainment, 
then one must bear in mind that operas started out as popular entertain-
ment.18 In cities like Vienna, there were opera houses for the masses, the 
so-called Volksoper. Mozart’s Magic Flute was originally staged in such 
an opera house, the audience consisting of just ordinary folks. It can be 
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added that Europeans are still inventive in the field of popular culture, as 
can be seen from the fact that the Big Brother reality concept is of Dutch 
origin and that Idol is a British invention. 
Worth mentioning and remembering is the fact that the noble art of 
moving images was invented in Europe, in France more precisely, and in 
the first years of movie making France was a world leader in film produc-
tion. French filmmakers made, among others, commercial crime serials, 
the first sci-fi film ever, the first vampire movies and thrillers about the 
master criminal Fantômas. At that time, the Americans were importing 
more films from France than they were exporting to that country.19 
Before the 1970s, the majority of European movies were made for com-
mercial purposes. Among them were such global blockbusters as the Asta 
Nielsen silent movies,20 the first James Bond movies, Spaghetti westerns 
and Scandinavian soft porn. In actual fact, most European countries had 
their own film industry, which basically produced light entertainment. 
These film industries differed quite a lot from one another, reflecting each 
country’s cultural tradition. In the first years after the Second World War, 
French cinema was dominated by an elegant and entertaining form of 
movies called cinema du papa. Light comedies starring comedians like 
Fernandel were the rage, not to mention the imbecile, semi-erotic movies 
starring sex kitten Brigitte Bardot. France’s neighbour Germany was no 
less commercial. During the era of silent film, the so-called Berg movies 
and Heimat movies were extremely popular in Germany, the heroes of 
the Berg-movies being hikers, while the Heimat movies were cosy films 
about the good, old folks back home. In many ways, the 1950s were the 
golden age of the Heimat movies. In this decade, the Germans flocked 
to the theatres to watch costume dramas and loved the locally invented 
genre of melodramatic Artztfilme (movies about medical doctors).21 The 
Germans, though, were not the only Europeans to capitalize on their own 
traditions. The Italians exploited their opera tradition for all that it was 
commercially worth. They invented the epic movie before the First World 
War, making such international successes as Quo Vadis? and Calibria. In 
the 1960s, they revived this tradition and made mythological epics once 
again, featuring some true blue beefcakes parading as gods. These mus-
cular gentlemen became gay icons in the USA. During the same period, 
the similar Italian Mondo Cane movies and the films about the cute little 
singer Robertino thrilled world audiences, singing the greatest Italian hit 
of all times O solo mio. The British also had their own commercial film 
industry; remember the Bond movies. Alfred Hitchcock made his first 
thrillers in his native Britain and in the 1950s and 60s the British Hammer 
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studios dominated the global horror market, though they faced some com-
petition from the Italian giallo (yellow) movies. At the same time, some 
witty Britons made the Carry-on movies, imbecile comedies for kids. The 
Monty Python movies were just as imbecile, but more British than steak 
and kidney pie. Note that just like Britain and Japan, Germany, France and 
Italy all have a feudal past. The fact that even feudalistic countries have 
had a thriving commercial film industry further weakens hypothesis (a). 
As for the victory of American entertainment industry over its competi-
tors, one explanation is that during the world wars filmmaking came to a 
virtual standstill in most European countries, leaving it to the American 
movies to fill the gap without difficulty.22 An even more important expla-
nation is the fact that the film industries in virtually all European coun-
tries were only cottage industries, unlike their dynamic and streamlined 
American competitors. The early days of the American film industry saw 
the studios practicing vertical integration, buying or establishing theatres, 
which solely showed the movies of the studios. So, even if Denmark’s 
Asta Nielsen was the first international film star, the idea of the film star 
came to fruition in Hollywood. The studios there methodically created 
the star system, making it a great vehicle for selling movies. On top of 
that, the Americans introduced Taylorism to the world of entertainment, 
for example producing dime novels on a kind of assembly line, so that 
one person invented the plot and another person wrote the love scenes 
etc. Tin Pan Alley was organized in a similar fashion, as was Hollywood. 
Its big studios were like factories, in stark contrast to the small European 
film industries. Attempts were made in some European countries to cre-
ate something like a local Hollywood, for instance the UFA studios in 
Berlin, Cinecitta in Italy and the J. Arthur Rank Organisation in England. 
These little Hollywoods even created their own local star systems, with 
their stars occasionally catapulted to world fame; witness the success of 
Brigitte Bardot or such Italian actresses as Sophia Loren and Gina Lollo-
brigida. But these attempts were bound to fail in the long run, as most of 
the little Hollywoods were making movies in their local languages, hardly 
exportable to other countries.23 Moreover, a large chunk of their movies 
were about that which Danish scholar Mette Hjort has called the themes 
of nation, which were not easily understandable outside local contexts.24 I 
also think that commercial films in some European countries were sand-
wiched between Hollywood and local art movies. The latter often got gov-
ernment support, which drained resources from local commercial film 
industry, making its battle with Hollywood even more of an uphill fight. 
To make matters worse for the European filmmakers, the vastness of the 
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United States gives Hollywood an edge over its competitors. It would not 
surprise me the least bit if this vastness made the products of the Ameri-
can film industry cheaper than those of other countries. Also, the density 
of screens is higher than in most European countries. That means that a 
film can play for fewer weeks in the US and reach the same number of 
potential spectators.25
In the 1920s, Hollywood could sell its movies to European theatres at 
something close to dumping prices. They were able to do so simply be-
cause they earned so much money at home, due to the size of the market. 
Add to this the fact that the American market for movies enjoyed what 
amounted to protection against foreign competition and you see that the 
European moviemakers were bound to lose. Moreover, it has been said that 
in the first years after the Second World War, the American author ities 
used direct and indirect pressure to strengthen the position of American 
movies in Europe, consciously promoting the American way of life as an 
antidote to communism.26 It is actually very difficult to see what vast-
ness of markets, density of screens, economic protectionism and political 
press ure have to do with egalitarianism. 
The European film industries began to crumble in the 1970s and 80s; 
symptomatically, the J. Arthur Rank Organisation stopped making mov-
ies in 1980 and the last Carry-On movie was made two years earlier. Just 
40 years ago, only 35 % of European box-revenues were earned by Ameri-
can films. Today, the figures are 80–90 % in some European countries.27 
To make matters worse, the market for European films in the US has al-
most disappeared.28 This disappearance has further weakened whatever 
is left of the European film industries.29 Actually, the present writer does 
not need these statistics, because he was raised on a healthy diet of both 
American and European commercial movies. When growing up in Iceland 
in the late 1950s and early 60s, he alternated between American Westerns, 
the Jerry Lewis films, Danish comedies, Swedish children’s movies about 
child detective Kalle Blomqvist and the German films about the teenybop-
pers Peter and Connie. 
It is hard to see how the American take-over of the European movie 
market in the last 40 years and the disappearance of European film in 
the US have anything to do with equality. If equality was a causal factor, 
then surely America would have become more equal in this period and/
or Europe become less equal. But as we will see later, the development has 
gone in the opposite direction. 
Similar things are happening in other realms of popular culture, for in-
stance pop music. Before the Beatles, most countries around the globe had 
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their local popular music. Occasionally, a song sung in French, German, 
Japanese or even Russian did make it to the charts in countries where 
these tongues were not spoken. Thus, in 1963 Kuy Sakamoto had a num-
ber one hit in the US with a song sung in Japanese, Sukyiaki. The same 
year, The Singing Nun from Belgium made it to the top of the American 
charts with her song Dominique, sung in French.30 This would be unthink-
able now, as Anglo-American pop music has taken over completely.
Only 40 years ago, German charts were still dominated by local Schläger, 
i.e. pop tunes with a peculiar German sound, sung in German.31 A song 
like Freddy Quinn’s Heimweh sold a couple of million copies in the late 
1950s.32, 33 Some of the Schläger even became international hits; for in-
stance, Lili Marleen or Marlene Dietrich’s Ich bin von Kopf bis Fuß auf 
Liebe eingestellt.34 In the 1960s, German big band leaders like James Last 
and Bert Kaempert led their bands to international successes, Kaempert’s 
band even reached the number one spot in the US in 1962. Later, one 
of his compositions, Strangers in the Night, became a huge international 
hit.35 The chances for a German musician to go that far in the US now-
a days are extremely small. It is also almost unthinkable that a modern 
German artist would utilise the German Schläger tradition for political 
purposes like Bert Brecht and his composers Hanns Eisler and Kurt Weill 
did. Songs like Mackie the Knife are as German as Apfelstrudel. 
Lists over German number one hits show us that until 1967 the over-
whelming majority of the number ones were sung in German.36 Some-
thing similar probably holds for other European countries, including 
France. Just as Germany had its proud tradition of the Schläger, France 
had its pop music tradition of the chansons. Who has not heard of such 
popular French singers as Edith Piaf, Juliette Greco, Jacques Brel or Charles 
Aznavour? And who has not hummed a tune or two from the hugely popu-
lar French musical Les Misèrables? 
After this long detour through the land of empirical facts, it is time to re-
turn to our American hero, Shusterman. He approvingly quotes Lawrence 
Levine, who talks as if a low-class, carnevalesque way of staging Shake-
speare was a unique American phenomenon.37 But if we are to believe 
Charles Dickens and Oscar Wilde, a similar way of staging the great Bard’s 
plays was common in British working class theatres. The storyteller of 
Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray describes a working class performance 
of Shakespeare and judges it as being extraordinarily vulgar.38 In Dickens’s 
novel Great Expectations, a working class audience demands that Hamlet 
should sing Rule Britannia.39 In Levine’s description of the American stag-
ing, the audiences demanded that the actors sing Yankee Doodle Dandy. 
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Chances are that these customs were imported from Britain, even though 
Levine does not mention it. So, Shusterman is not the only American 
scholar who automatically assumes that the US somehow monopolizes 
low-class culture. He is in other words not the only prominent American 
scholar who has a US-centric view of the world. But of course, this US-
centrism is understandable in light of the fact that the US is leading in so 
many fields of culture and science. A further redeeming factor is the fact 
that American academics are not the only ones who are inward looking; 
French academics are even worse; they tend to be Franco-centric.40
Be that as it may, (c) is dead wrong. And in the course of responding to 
(c), we have found even further reasons to doubt (a) and (b). 
(e) Comparing the US with Europe: Shusterman’s sweeping generalizations 
about Europe do not hold water. There is no such thing as Europe; Europe is 
an American invention. Shusterman commits the American fallacy, speak-
ing about Europe as if it was a country, not a continent. The inhabitants 
of the United States have a common national identity; in fact, they tend 
to be very patriotic. But this is not so in Europe; there is no real European 
identity, only a collection of different national identities, just like there are 
different national identities in the Western hemisphere. A Frenchman com-
pares to a Portuguese like an American does to a Mexican when it comes to 
national identities, not like a Texan to a Californian or a Jewish-American 
to an African-American. Discoursing about Europe in Shusterman’s typi-
cal American fashion is just like putting forth generalizations about the 
Western hemisphere or Eastern Asia. It could be added that until recently, 
the Spaniards identified more closely with Spanish speaking Latin Amer-
ica than with any European country, forming a common, popular cultural 
market with the Hispanics. Likewise, the Portuguese lived in a Portuguese-
speaking world with their Brazilian and African cousins while the British 
were more interested in their empire than Continental Europe. And the 
French are still pretty much wrapped up in themselves. So creating a Eu-
ropean identity could prove a Herculean task. 
In contrast to what Shusterman seems to think, a sizable number of Euro-
pean countries do not have a national church; yet again we see a lack of a 
common denominator for these countries. Now, Shusterman hints at there 
being causal connections between the existence of such churches and the 
strength of popular culture and/or receptivity to American popular culture. 
If this was the case, then one would have expected countries without a na-
tional church to be more receptive to this culture, as well as having stronger 
popular cultures than those who have such a church. But the Scandinavians 
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with their national churches are more receptive to American popular cul-
ture than the French, who do not have a national church. 
As we remember, Shusterman talks like there is a strong tradition for 
philosophy and cultural elitism everywhere in Europe. The trouble is that 
most European countries have no philosophical tradition to speak of; we 
see here yet another example of a lack of a common European ground. 
Moreover, in countries like Iceland and Norway, people tend to frown upon 
abstract thinking and cultural elites. Nevertheless, the inhabitants of these 
two countries are more receptive to American popular culture than people 
in countries with a much stronger tradition for philosophy and cultural elit-
ism; recall what I said about the French being less taken by American popu-
lar culture than the Scandinavians. This further weakens Shusterman’s 
contention that young Europeans are attracted to American popular culture 
because of its liberating effect. Moreover, this weakens hypothesis (b). 
Now to the question of whether or not Europe is less equal than the US: 
If Shusterman by egalitarian means egalitarian in terms of income then 
the majority of Western European countries (including the Nordic ones) is 
much more egalitarian than the US. The basic problem in some of the Nor-
dic countries is oppressive egalitarianism, not lack of equality. America’s 
strength lies in its individualism, dynamic ways, creativity and great diver-
sity, not its egalitarianism. Nevertheless, Shusterman has a point when he 
says that the American class structure has traditionally been less rigid than 
that of the major European countries.41 But, in the first place, there are signs 
of this being a thing of the past. Recent research points in the direction of 
there being more social mobility within the Nordic countries and Germany 
than in the US.42 This development has taken place over the last 25 years, 
the period in which the US took a decisive lead in most aspects of popular 
culture; even rock music, the old domain of the Britons. So the US reached 
economic equality in the same period as it acquired predominance in the 
sphere of popular culture. This fact hardly strengthens Shusterman’s im-
plicit conjecture about egalitarianism creating the preconditions for the 
flourishing of popular culture. 
Secondly, if Shusterman by egalitarian means egalitarian in terms of 
culture, then he is wrong again. There are large parts of Europe where cul-
tural equality is greater than in the USA. In the Nordic and Eastern Euro-
pean countries, the general level of education is quite high and it is not 
unusual that ordinary people are thoroughly well-read and highly culti-
vated. In Russia, Europe’s most populous country, there are scores of poor 
old babushkas that know Pushkin’s poems by heart. Furthermore, quite 
a number of leading Nordic writers started out as ordinary workingmen. 
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That illustrious list includes the Nobel Prize winners Knut Hamsun and 
Harry Martinsson, both raised in abject poverty. So, if Shusterman thinks 
that the upper classes monopolize the fine arts or that there are no egalitar-
ian cultures in Europe, then he is dead wrong. 
In addition, it simply is not true that all European countries have feudal 
traditions, Iceland and Norway being cases in point. Besides, the US had 
slavery longer than any Western European country. It is, of course, well 
known that African-Americans were discriminated against long after the 
abolition of slavery. Further, the Native Americans have had a hard time, 
to put it mildly, almost as hard as Jews and Gypsies in certain European 
countries. Jews were also victims of discrimination in the US, albeit much 
more mildly, before the war. It is said that it was almost impossible for a 
Jewish academic to get a professorship in an American University before 
1945. It can be added that in Arthur Miller’s play Broken Glass, one of the 
characters is a Jewish doctor who went to Germany (of all places) in the 
1920s in order to study because he was unable to get into American medi-
cal school as a result of his ethnic origin. Interestingly enough, the Jews 
who laid the foundation for Hollywood left the East Coast to get away 
from the ruling Yankee establishment.43 So, maybe Hollywood rose out of 
discrimination, not egalitarianism. In a new documentary, highlighting 
the history of Jewish popular culture in America, it is understood that at 
the beginning of the last century, many Jews entered into show business 
because of discrimination. They did not have many other options. These 
are among the reasons why there has been such a strong Jewish impact 
on jazz and other forms of American popular music. If the US had been 
more egalitarian, then far fewer Jews would have worked in show biz 
and, as a consequence, perhaps American popular culture would not have 
had the enormous strength it has today. To this it may be added that dis-
crimination of blacks could be one of the reasons for their great impact 
on American popular culture. Until recently, popular culture was one of 
the few venues that African-Americans had for striking it rich. Now it is 
sometimes said that the working classes in Britain were the blacks of Brit-
ish society. Remember that the British working class kids used rock as a 
means of breaking class barriers. Had Britain been less of class society in 
the 1960s, then the working class kids could have made it without play-
ing rock and roll. The working class kids might have found other ways, 
besides that of rock and roll, to better their lot. The implication is that had 
Britain been more egalitarian, then it might not have been so influential 
in popular music. If this is true, then we have less of a reason to believe in 
hypothesis a) than we already have. 
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In the light of the aforementioned facts, maintaining that the US is a 
paragon of egalitarian virtues is plainly preposterous and, therefore, (d) is 
undoubtedly wrong. In the course of criticizing (d), we have found further 
reasons to doubt (a) and (b). 
My conclusion is that hypotheses (a), (c), and (d) are blatantly wrong while 
there is probably a grain of truth in (b). We can summarize the contents of 
this article in the following fashion: In the first place, the US does not mon-
opolize popular culture; there is and there never has been any lack of such 
culture in Europe. Secondly, comparing a country, the US, with a continent, 
Europe, is not very fruitful. Thirdly, the United States is not necessarily 
more equal than a host of European countries. Fourthly, equality does not 
seem to be a better breeding ground for popular culture than inequality. 
In the course of refuting these four hypotheses, we have also been criti-
cizing US-centrism. Shusterman’s US-centrism is evident from the fact that 
he talks about popular music as if it was the exclusive domain of the sup-
posedly egalitarian Americans. However, he only analyzes such arch-typical 
American forms of music like rap and country.44 He hardly ever mentions 
kinds of popular music in which Europeans have had a strong say, for in-
stance rock, pop and techno, the last being a German invention.
Shusterman is well advised in ridding himself of US-centrism, as well 
as revising and strengthening the empirical part of his otherwise excel-
lent theorizing. 
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